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 ABSTRACT
As the world’s population continues to urbanize, urban studies are increasingly 
important. Studying the social science behind the rise of the city and its effect on various 
social phenomena should be a priority for scholars in the field of politics, sociology, and 
communication, because of the reasonable assumption that the environment of the city 
alters the way that a person engages people and systems within the city. This is especially 
true for peripheral and marginalized populations that often lack access to the social 
institutions necessary to improve their livelihoods. Using Diffusion of Innovation and 
urban studies theories of Anomie, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, and Mechanical and 
Organic Solidarity as a beginning theory base, this research studies the role of the city 
and perceptions of community size in developing local political efficacy. Participants 
from cities of different sizes (Abilene, Texas and Dallas, Texas) were surveyed on their 
perceptions of community size, levels of urbanization, and their political efficacy to 
determine the role that urbanization, city size, and perception plays in shaping political 
efficacy. The results from this study suggest that neither the city, nor the perceptions of 
its size and urbanization have a significant relationship with local political efficacy, but 
age, race, religion, and income all appear to be accurate predictors of political efficacy. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION, RATIONALE, AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction 
The communication between politicians and their constituents is key to 
formulating policies that coincide with the wishes of those that elect these representatives 
to office. However, political efficacy is a key aspect of ensuring that the people elected 
are chosen by an electorate that sees the political process as accessible and capable of 
bettering their livelihood. Without a politically efficacious population, voting rates may 
lower, political participation may lag, or politics may be manipulated by certain 
individuals against the will of a government’s constituents themselves.  
 This is especially the case in the instance of local governments, both in large and 
small cities. A municipal government’s decisions are a major factor in the everyday lives 
of its constituents, from public transportation, to zoning laws, and even to the 
implementation of social service programs. This makes research into the communication 
between local governments and the people incredibly important, and it raises a number of 
different questions. Is there a significant difference in local political efficacy for urban 
low-income persons based on city size and demographics? Do political communication 
strategies differ in their effectiveness based on community size and demographics? How 
does political communication with persons in poverty differ between rural and urban 
areas?  These examples stimulate foundational research linking systems to behaviors 
which, in fact, is the point of the present study. 
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Literature Review 
 Research analyzing the relative effectiveness of local political communication and 
outreach between different populations is limited. Most research into political 
communication looks at the growth of new media, emerging information abundance in 
political communication, and its effect on the general populace (Blumer & Kavanagh, 
1999; Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 2001). Research usually centers instead on national media 
outlets during Presidential or other national campaigns (Denver & Hands, 1997; 
Froehlich & Rüdiger, 2006; Rucinski & Salmon, 1990). For instance, McLeod, 
Scheufele, and Moy’s (1999) research on mass media and interpersonal discussion in 
local political participation found that television news had no direct impact on 
institutionalized political participation, but that community integration and forum 
participation orienting voters towards the larger community positively affected the 
participation in local political institutions. However important this research on 
communication strategies and relative effectiveness for local governments may be, this 
research does not seem to compare rural and urban areas, nor does it analyze the 
effectiveness of communication strategies based on geographic location (specifically 
large urban/small city/rural areas). 
 The little research on political communication in urban and rural areas has 
focused less on issues of transparency for marginalized populations, and more on the way 
technology continues to change the deliberation process in local governments. Lin and 
Geertman’s (2015) research into collaborative governance in the emerging “smart city” 
of the 21st century suggests an effective method of political communication and 
governance for persons living in the modern-day city, but does not assess the potential 
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problems that “smart governance” may pose for persons without access to technology 
that makes urban planning and governance more collaborative in the technological age. 
This research does take steps towards increasing transparency by introducing different 
techniques that may increase this transparency, although these issues do not target issues 
of transparency for the urban poor, nor do they address governmental transparency issues 
for persons living outside the new and improved “smart city” – populations that live in 
less populous areas and may not benefit from the luxuries provided to those living in 
more densely populated areas, such as Level A MSAs. Therefore, the “consensus 
building” that Lin and Geertman (2015) reference is more difficult for those living 
outside the large city and for those living in the city but without access to the 
transparency offered by techniques of smart governance. 
 In short, this abbreviated sample of the effects of community size on individual or 
communal activity is embryonic. Thus, researchers in these related areas can turn to 
established theories to facilitate explanation, such as Diffusion of Innovations, Anomie, 
and Organic Solidarity perspectives. 
Diffusion of Innovation 
 Diffusion research is the method that ideas and innovations are distributed within 
and among societies. According to Rogers (2003), it is “the process in which an 
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a 
social system” (p. 5). Biesenbender and Tosun (2014) defined diffusion as “the socially 
mediated spread of policies across and within political systems” and includes 
communication and learning processes across and within populations of adopters” (p. 
425).  Through the use of bidirectional communication, diffusion occurs (or fails to 
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occur) between two groups, causing them to adopt new ideas (or fail to). According to 
Rogers (2003), “diffusion is a type of social change” meaning that “alteration occurs in 
the structure and function of a social system” (p. 6). But what makes these structures 
more apt to change? What makes diffusion more possible in a community or its 
structures?  
 How do structures like local politics make change possible, and how do they 
encourage spontaneous and calculated diffusion of innovations? Structures can either 
inhibit or enable patterns of diffusion. According to Rogers (2003), “structure gives 
regularity and stability to human behavior in a system; it allows one to predict behavior 
with some degree of accuracy. Thus, structure represents a type of information, in that it 
decreases uncertainty” (p. 24). The structure as a key aspect of diffusion, and social 
structure or the “social relationships among the members of a system” can “facilitate or 
impede the diffusion of innovations” (Rogers, 2003, pp. 24-25).  
 This research analyzes the effect that community size has on feelings of efficacy 
and the interaction between low-income persons and their local/municipal governments. 
Rogers’ (2003) Diffusion theory presents the effect that social network size and 
community factors have on an individual’s ability to informally influence other attitudes 
or behaviors “in a desired way with relative frequency,” a phenomenon he calls “opinion 
leadership” (p. 300). This opinion leadership can be explained using the “two-step flow 
model” suggesting that traditional views of the mass media and its influence and power 
are flawed, and that the communication process between groups in social networks may 
be a multistage and multifaceted communication process, functioning differently in “an 
individual’s innovation-decision process” (Rogers, 2003, p. 304).  
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 Understanding the interaction between groups and the diffusion of ideas and 
powers among those groups can be further understood by the “degree to which a pair of 
individuals are similar”, a phenomena Rogers (2003) calls homophily. According to 
Tarde (as cited in Rogers, 2003), “social relations . . . are much closer between 
individuals who resemble each other in occupation and education,” and Rogers (2003) 
argued that these homogeneous groups that communicate with one another prevent the 
spread of ideas vertically, slowing down diffusion within a system (p. 64; p. 307). This 
lack of interaction between different groups could help explain structural barriers that 
limit the political efficacy of low-income groups, who may lack access to communicative 
interaction with groups in higher socioeconomic groups that may have more efficacy in 
the political system. However, when networks and groups of people are more 
heterogeneous, Rogers (2003) argued that individuals are able to interact with individuals 
of higher socioeconomic status, education, and media exposure, which may increase 
levels of efficacy. This may be the case with groups that gather the attention of their local 
elected officials, who have more access to instruments of change than those groups would 
have without that interaction (p. 308).  
 In a way, city government officials may act in a certain capacity as “opinion 
leaders.” An ideal elected municipal government official, after all, would meet Rogers’ 
(2003) characteristics of decisions makers, including adequate external communication, 
accessibility to their followers (or constituents in this instance), socioeconomic status, 
and innovativeness (pp. 316-318). City government officials’ ability to empower their 
more vulnerable populations are dependent on these factors; however, the effect that 
community size and immediacy has on that relationship may have an effect on the 
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efficacy of that official’s constituents. The importance of external communication and 
immediacy in a larger community may require more action on behalf of the leader 
towards that leader’s constituency, though the homophily of low-income and 
disenfranchised populations could have a negative effect on that communication.  
 Much of the separation between these constituents and their local politician or 
efficacious action in the political system may be dependent on the structures of their 
community. According to Rogers (2003), formal and informal structures have a 
significant effect on the “communication flows in a system,” making the diffusion of 
information and efficacy more or less difficult for a community or the members of that 
network (p. 24). Communication structures develop patterns in behavior for the members 
of that community, positively or negatively affecting the individual behaviors of those 
individual members of that structure. Attitudes towards voting, making political change, 
and habits of political involvement, therefore, can depend on the communications 
structures’ patterns that develop within a community.  
 According to Rogers (2003), socioeconomic status has a strong relationship with 
access to change agents, making change and innovation in communities dependent a lot 
on the access that individuals in that community have on their socioeconomic status (p. 
159). Concerning the diffusion of innovation and a comparison of high and low 
innovative localities, Walker, Avellaneda, and Berry (2011) found that external pressures 
seem to be strong indicators of adoption in low innovation areas, simultaneously 
remarking that information accessibility could be a good indicator of innovation diffusion 
within communities and organizations. Similarly, Biesenbender and Tosun (2014) 
claimed that information and education are key to the diffusion of ideas within 
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developing or low-innovation communities. Biesenbender and Tosun (2014) also 
remarked that policy diffusion is dependent on “emulating” actors or communities that 
they view as “high innovators” (p. 425). According to Graham, Shipan, and Volden 
(2013) the importance of diffusion research in the political realm highlights the way that 
policies diffuse from one government to another, allowing for innovative policy decisions 
to move between communities. Low-income persons can also be negatively affected by 
change in other sectors of the environment. Rogers (2003) explains the phenomena this 
way:  
whether a new automobile such as the hybrid gas/electric car is designed as a low-
priced sedan or as a high -end model determines whether middle-income or 
wealthy consumers will purchase it. Whether a research topic will benefit larger 
or smaller farmers largely determines who will eventually adopt the results of 
such research and the consequences of the research-based technological 
innovations (p. 159).  
Applied to an urban political sphere, decisions such as zoning laws, permits, and other 
city investments may develop in ways that positively affect those with greater access to 
the ear of their local politicians, which may give them environmental privileges over low-
income neighborhoods that don’t have regular access to those systems. The decisions 
made by these politicians may therefore increase the inequality of the community. 
Decisions should be “developed and diffused in a way that leads to greater equality 
(rather than inequality) in their socioeconomic consequences” (Rogers, 2003, p. 159). But 
how do communities do this? Rogers (2003) suggested that “the answer lies in how 
socioeconomic status factors affect each stage in the innovation-development process” (p. 
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159). Analyzing the way that poverty and wealth affects the decision-making process of 
elected officials is the best way to ensure a more fair and equitable society.  
Tönnies, Durkheim, and Theories of Urbanization 
Anomie. One theory that can be used to explain differences in political efficacy 
for marginalized populations is the concept of anomie. According to Durkheim (1979) in 
his analysis of suicide trends in Europe, the concept of anomie suggests that  
no living being can be happy or even exist unless his [sic] needs are sufficiently 
proportioned to his [sic] needs. In other words if [a person’s] needs require more 
than can be granted . . . they will be under continual friction and can only function 
painfully (p. 246).  
In a state of anomie, “each in his [sic] sphere vaguely realizes the extreme limit set to his 
[sic] ambitions and aspires to nothing beyond;” therefore, by being “docile to collective 
authority” a person “feels that it is not well to ask more” (Durkheim, 1979, p. 250).  
 The interesting nature of anomie, Durkheim (1979) notes, is that it does not have 
the effect of producing despair or radically large notions of suicide, but rather that it acts 
as “a restraint in itself” (p. 254). The social conditions created by poverty create a 
complacent population, where “the less one has the less [one] is tempted to extend the 
needs of his [sic] needs indefinitely” (Durkheim, 1979, p. 254). Norasakkunkit and 
Uchida (2011) remarked that “those who are most affected by economic structural 
change . . . are likely to be segments of the population who move away from the center of 
society due to changing circumstances in their society” (p. 775). According to Dawson 
(2012), the constant presence and “continued dominance of economic anomie” explains 
the growing need for certain groups to “find the answer to the social question” (pp. 702-
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703). The large segments of the population most affected by economic marginalization 
seek answers to those economic hardships in social ways, such as through avenues like 
the Occupy Movement. The effect of anomie on these groups, according to 
Norasakkunkit and Uchida (2011), is that these individuals move to the “periphery of 
society,” where “they may no longer be under the pressure to internalize the dominant 
psychological orientations,” but instead, “they may . . . maintain or develop more 
‘atypical’ psychological tendencies” (p. 775) 
Mechanical and Organic Solidarity. Along with Durkheim’s concept of anomie 
and its relation to the development and permeation of social structures is the concept of 
Mechanical and Organic Solidarity. According to Thijssen (2012), the theory of solidarity 
stresses “the structural bases of solidarity as well as its evolution” with the growth and 
development of society (p. 455). As structures change, the way they interact with 
members of a society, as well as the way these members interact with each other, 
changes. Durkheim’s analysis of the growth of the city and its relation to individual 
behavior can also be seen in the concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity. In 
Durkheim’s The Division of Labour in Society (1893; 2005), he commented that as 
society grows, and humans become extensions of the societies they are part of, the 
connection “between the variations in happiness and the progress of the division of 
labour [sic]” disappears (p. 292). In fact, as a society grows, the study of that society 
shifts from the effect of that society on human happiness (Durkheim, 1893; 2005, p. 292). 
 Colombo, Mosso, and De Piccoli (2001), in their research on perceptions of 
community and participation in urban contexts, describe the homogeneity and voluntary 
relationships within community as concepts that do not take into account “the dynamic 
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and conflicting components that may be present at the level of the local community, in 
particular within urban contexts” (p. 462). In fact, according to Colombo and colleagues 
(2001), the view of community as an expression of relationship and solidarity fails to 
account for the dynamics and expressions of power present in even small communities.  
 These communities are key to identity formation and expression. According to 
Côté (1996), the structures and social interactions present in communities are expressions 
of “culture-identity” which are key to “identity capital” (p. 417). In fact, this interaction 
between community and identity occurs over three different levels: social structures (such 
as political and economic systems), daily interactions between members of a community, 
and personality (which includes concepts such as the ego and identity) (Cóté, 1996, p. 
417). If community and structures are such an important aspect of identity, expression, 
and efficacy, this means that research examining these structures that make up a 
community are important to best maximize the efficacy of community members.  
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Another theory that corresponds with 
Durkheim’s concept of mechanical and organic solidarity is the concept of Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft. Tönnies (1887; 1940; 2005) in his description of the way that societies 
develop described Gemeinshaft as “community” or “association,” which he distinguished 
from Gesellschaft, which he described as “society” or “public life” (p. 277) As a society 
grows, the associations between individuals in that society become less voluntary and 
more institutionalized. According to Tönnies (1887; 1940; 2005), Gesellschaft is “a mere 
coexistence of people independent of each other” making it different than the mechanical 
solidarity offered by Gemeinschaft associations (p. 277). Friendships and voluntary 
associations, being “the least organic and intrinsically necessary” relations between 
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persons, become more habitual and deterministic with the growth of the urban 
community, “in which nonrelated members and servants participate” (Tönnies, 1887; 
1940; 2005, p. 278). Similarly, Greenfield (2013) claims “a key characteristic of 
Gesellschaft environments is that they are urban” and have characteristics of 
“commercial economies, complex technology, and high levels of wealth” (p. 1722).  
 Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft has been used as a means of developing 
“ecological and cultural change” in human organization, whereas “a key characteristic of 
Gemeinschaft environments is that they are rural . . . interrelating characteristics [such as] 
subsistence economies, simple technologies, and low levels of wealth” (Greenfield, 2013, 
p. 1722). Gesellschaft environments espouse “individualistic values, behavior, and 
psychology (centered on the independent and unique individual)” (p. 1722). According to 
Christenson (1984), “Gesellschaft describes an interactional system characterized by self-
interest, competition, and negotiated accommodation” (p. 160). On the other hand, 
Christenson (1984) describes Gemeinschaft cultures as “binding,” made up of “primary 
interactional relationships based on sentiment” (p. 160). Greenfield (2013) described the 
culture of Gemeinschaft as made up of “collectivistic values, behavior” and “centered on 
the interdependent family or community” (p. 1722).  
 Together, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft describe an ecological theory of 
behavior, which Greenfield (2013) remarked was a “view-point . . . that ecological 
factors operate synergistically and interactively, not in isolation” and that those factors 
alter cultural features and behavior of the residents of those various ecologies.  Greenfield 
(2013) argued that the concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft have amalgamated into 
a theory of ecology in which the surroundings of individuals and the societies that they 
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participate affect their behavior, and that “ecological change will modify values, 
behaviors, and psychology” (p. 1723). Bonner (1998), discussed Tonnies’ Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft as a theory of community that stratified two dialectical opposites, 
whereas “we have neither evolutionary (Darwin) nor revolutionary (Marx) development, 
but two sharply opposed social systems based on sharply opposing ways of life” (p. 173). 
Christenson (1984) claims that values associated with the social fabric of communities 
“are interrelated with daily living conditions” with “clear but moderate associations’ (p. 
167). Ecological theories center around the way that “ecological conditions drive cultural 
change” or, more specifically, the way that “urban-rural residence” has changed over 
time, and the effect of that shift on behaviors, attitudes, and ideas (Greenfield, 2013, p. 
1725).  
 Some argue that the separation between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is 
exaggerated, or even non-existent. According to Bell (1992), the “rural-urban continuum 
is relatively unimportant” (p. 78). However, what is especially important while analyzing 
the concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is understanding the non-binary nature of 
the two ideas. Christenson (1984) argued that the two ideas should “avoid the polarity of 
the concepts along a single continuum that has plagued popular usage of the terms” (p. 
168). Mellow (2005) also argued that though the terms Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
are often mistakenly presented as a dichotomy, instead, these terms do not exist as pure 
forms, but rather, that different localities respond differently from one another to 
Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft culture. Greenfield (2013) echoed this thinking, remarking 
that the concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft “encompass multiple variables that 
operate synergistically and interactively” (p. 1725). Mellow (2005) suggested something 
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similar, that rural/urban spaces are not binaries, nor are they all encompassing, but rather 
that social organization of urban and rural spaces are harder to distinguish (p. 51). 
Greenfield (2013) uses the shift in urban definition as an example of the synergistic and 
interactive nature of the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft continuum: “in 2000, the [operational 
definition of urban population] changed to densely settled territory, termed urbanized 
areas” and “urban clusters.” In all definitions of “urban,” the remaining population is 
considered rural” (p. 1725). 
This argument indicates that the difference between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
communities and their residents is more apt to definitions and continuums. Abilene, 
though it is an “urban area” by definition, is further along the urban/rural continuum 
compared to cities like Dallas, Texas. Because of this, some Gesellschaft factors of 
Dallas may not exist at the same level in Abilene, and Abilene may maintain what Bell 
(1992) describes as the “ghost” of community (p. 79).  
The Effects of Rural and Urban Areas 
There has been little research analyzing the rural urban divide on issues like local 
politics. Though research over methods of measuring and monitoring urban and rural 
poor has developed, comparisons between the two populations are few and far between. 
Beaudoin and Thorson (2004), in their comparison of social capital between urban and 
rural communities, found that access to media is positively correlated to increases in 
social capital, which itself has a positive relationship with pro-social behavior, increasing 
the likelihood of an individual to volunteer and engage in civil society, and to a lesser 
extent the likelihood of a person to vote (although voting behavior was less tied to social 
capital/trust than other methods of civic engagement). In their comparison of rural and 
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urban populations, Beaudoin and Thorson (2004) found that although rural populations 
have higher levels of community trust than their urban counterparts, every other measure 
of social capital, including voting, was not significantly different, indicating that “the 
nature of life and culture in the rural and urban communities does not appear to alter the 
manner in which people interact and participate civically and socially,” and that “urban 
communities are not as socially bleak and isolated” as some research suggests (p. 392).  
 There is some debate over the distinction between rural and urban poverty and 
whether or not we should distinguish the two. Some scholars believe that there is a 
difference between urban and rural poverty. Wratten (1995) disagreed, saying that the 
distinction between the two in policy making is not “useful” because “any such 
classification is intrinsically arbitrary” and that “determinants of urban and rural poverty 
are interlinked” (p. 33).  On the other hand, Amis (1995), in his study of urban poverty 
and potential policy actions to combat the impacts of poverty, reported that studying 
urban poverty is key because poverty is centralizing within urban areas, arguing that 
urban poverty tends to be structural and is also considered “land-scarce poverty” meaning 
that people are in poverty because they lack access to land and employment at a level of 
proper subsistence (Amis, 1995, p. 148). The lack of access for urban populations to land 
or agricultural employment makes urban poverty unique. Similarly, Wilson and Aponte 
(1985) claimed that “to say that poverty has become increasingly urbanized is to note a 
remarkable change in the concentration of poor people in the United States in only 
slightly more than a decade” (p. 239). According to Wilson (2003), the origins of urban 
poverty come out of the early 1970s, when a “significant out-migration of working- and 
middle-class families from inner-city ghetto neighbourhoods [sic] combined with rising 
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numbers of poor residents due to escalating rates of joblessness [led to] heavy 
concentrations of ghetto poverty” (p. 1101). Small and Newman (2001) claim that 
“structural changes in the economy, such as a shift from manufacturing to service 
industries and the departure of low-skilled jobs from the urban centers, increased black 
joblessness in central city ghettos” which, when matched with the “flight of middle- and 
working-class blacks” created a new “underclass” of poor minority populations (p. 24). 
For today’s inner city low-income, city life “features a group of poor residents whose 
major predicament is rising joblessness” while “contact between groups of different class 
and racial backgrounds has decreased” from the migration of middle-class and working-
class white residents (Wilson, 2003, p. 1101). 
 Analyzing the gap between urban and rural areas centers around a politics of place 
(Masuda & Garvin, 2008). Politics and spaces act in tandem with one another in the 
formation of identity, and areas that are urban, rural, and in between are all key in 
understanding persons’ access to agency.  Understanding this agency “is best 
conceptualized through a historically contingent politics of place” (Masuda & Garvin, 
2008, p. 122). According to Hoffman (2014), the subject living within urban spaces not 
only is a resident “located” in the urban, but also becomes “of” the urban, normalized 
through institutions of local governance key to the formulation of the urban identity (p. 
1576).  This finding explains why studies of local government are so important. They 
underscore the formulation of identity in the urban/rural spheres and serve instrumentally 
in engaging in civic life and expressing agency. There is especially a lack of study in the 
rural areas. Goodwin (1998) calls upon more research into the field of rural studies and 
local governance issues, claiming that there is a significant silence in rural studies over 
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the ways that rural areas are governed and the level of effectiveness of that governance.  
 This request for research is echoed by the growing need for research on issues 
facing smaller communities, especially rural poverty, which according to Tickamyer and 
Duncan (1990), like its urban counterpart, stems from a limited opportunity structure, 
“the outcome of both past social and economic development policies and current 
economic transformation” (p. 67). According to Wratten (1995), poverty has shifted, 
“becoming increasingly concentrated in urban settlements” and causing problems such as 
rising food prices, wage stagnation, and lack of access to necessary infrastructure and 
affordable housing (p. 11). This growth in urban poverty, however, does not separate the 
issues of rural and urban poverty, and Tacoli (2003) claims that dividing research into 
distinctly urban and distinctly rural areas “actually makes life more difficult for low-
income groups” (p. 3).  
The Effects of City Size on Politics 
 Research into the effect that city size has on feelings of trust and political 
competence among persons is varied. Rahn and Rudolph (2005), in their research into the 
effect of city size on political trust, found a negative correlation between the population 
of a city and the average political trust of its people (p. 548), though other factors affected 
this variation in political trust. Oliver (2000) found that levels of civic engagement and 
participation decreased in all areas when moving from smaller communities to larger 
communities, with one exception. The exception that he found was in local voting 
participation, which did not change significantly based on community size. Looking at 
participants’ variations in confidence in their political competence, Finifter and 
Abramson (1975) argue that a significant difference in feelings of political confidence 
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based on large and small communities has a negligible effect in countries besides the 
United States (p. 192). This finding implies that those in smaller communities in the 
United States feel significantly more competent than their big city counterparts, but those 
in other countries, such as Mexico, Germany, Britain, and Italy, experienced little to no 
difference in comparative competence based on their community size.  
 It appears that the relationship between community size and political confidence, 
civic participation, and trust is complicated and at times spurious, or at least significantly 
affected by a number of different X factors. Eric Oliver (2000), in his study of the effect 
of city size and suburban growth on political participation, found that “lower 
participation rates in larger places must result from differences in resources, political 
interest, and/or patterns of political mobilization” (p. 368). Finifter and Abramson (1975) 
found that this relationship of lower civic participation in larger cities compared to 
smaller cities was complicated by education level and socioeconomic status, which 
diminished the reliability of a bivariate relationship between city size and civic 
participation. Similarly, regarding the effect that city size has on low-income persons, 
Rahn and Rudolph (2005) found that, though city size has an inverse effect on the 
political trust of its citizens, education has a positive, significant relationship on levels of 
political trust, compounding the effect of city size on levels of political trust. 
Political Efficacy 
 Developing a measure for political efficacy is an area of contention for 
researchers that has developed since its inception in the 1950s by the Center for Political 
Study. Yeich and Levine (1994) define political efficacy as “a term used to represent an 
individual’s perceived ability to participate in and influence the political system” (p. 
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259). Political efficacy measures a person’s feelings of involvement and influence in a 
political system. Neimi, Craig, and Mattei (1991) referred to political efficacy as “one of 
the most theoretically important and frequently used” indicators of general political 
attitude (p. 1407).  According to J. Miller McPherson, Susan Welch, and Cal Clark 
(1977), “political efficacy is an important concept in the analysis of American political 
behavior, having been used to explain a wide variety of political activities and attitudes” 
(p. 509).  Kahne and Westheimer (2006) remarked that political efficacy (or an 
individual’s sense that he or she can make a difference) has a significant effect on that 
person’s civic participation (p. 289). It is therefore in the interest of scholars to measure 
and determine different levels of political efficacy among populations that they feel are 
disengaged from various areas of civic life. 
 Political efficacy itself is dichotomous, made up of two different levels — internal 
and external. Taken together, these two concepts develop a more holistic view of the way 
that individuals feel that they can influence the political landscape. Clark and Acock 
(1989) defined these two different levels of political efficacy: “internal efficacy” is “the 
perception that one has the requisite skills and resources to influence the political 
system,” and “external efficacy” is “the perception that government institutions and elites 
are responsive to one’s attempts to exert political influence” (p. 551). Pollock (1983) 
used the term “external political efficacy” (EPE) as a reference to “whether or not the 
individual perceives the political system as potentially responsive to popular demand” (p. 
403). This is a “conceptually distinct” term from internal political efficacy (IPE), which 
“refers to the individual’s perception of his or her own competence as a political actor, 
quite apart from his/her evaluations of the political system” (p. 403). Although EPE and 
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IPE are different and distinct measurements from one another, Pollock (1983), in his 
analysis of the behavioral correlation of the two, found that there is a “highly suggestive 
relationship between . . . measures of internal and external political efficacy” (p. 403). 
 Together, IPE and EPE create a measure of political efficacy which can be studied 
in its relationship with various demographic factors to measure the way that political 
efficacy is affected by different population factors. Studies in political efficacy have 
grown significantly in the study of who engages in the political system and why.  
 Political efficacy can be negatively influenced by a number of factors. Beaumont 
(2011) remarked that “discrepancies in the political resources . . . people acquire by 
virtue of socioeconomic status and personal background—political knowledge, 
experience, norms, and so on—often persist and compound over time, disempowering 
large segments of the population” and negatively affecting political efficacy in certain 
populations (p. 216). The racial makeup of populations is affected by different 
phenomena in response to growth or loss in political efficacy. Spence, McClerking, and 
Brown (2009), in their study of black political participation, claimed that factors like 
racial makeup of city councils and black mayors have a positive effect on political 
efficacy, although the effect of these factors diminished over time. 
 All of these factors being measured are indirect measures of internal and external 
political efficacy, and though they seem to relate to one another in a number of ways, this 
is not always the case, and some have little to no effect on one another. For instance, 
Rahn and Rudolph (2005) found that “contrary to expectations, trust in local government 
appears to be unrelated to civic engagement,” claiming that those citizens that “engage in 
even large numbers of voluntary organizations are no more trusting than those that 
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remain uninvolved” (p. 548). Granted, this study included non-political measures of civic 
engagement, and the civic involvement questions included more than just voting and 
participation in local political groups. Nevertheless, it appears that those that are involved 
in a large number of volunteer organizations are not more likely to trust local politicians 
or local political institutions. Instead, it appears that education levels and socioeconomic 
status are greater indicators of political trust (Rahn & Rudolph, 2005). Furthermore, 
factors like demographic composition are also key in measuring perceptions of political 
competence — another factor of political efficacy — in the context of city size (Finifter 
& Abramson, 1975, p. 197; Oliver, 2000, p. 364).  
 Abilene, surrounded by rural communities, and approximately 1/10th the size of 
Dallas represents a rural metropolitan area, whose population is concentrated but still 
distinctly rural in identification and character. A comparison of Abilene to the urban 
metropolis of Dallas, Texas, is important for understanding the way that people in 
poverty are affected in their political trust, participation, and feelings of competence 
based on their location. Does Abilene’s size make it easier for people in poverty to 
connect to local political organizations? Does it make it easier to vote in local elections? 
Does Abilene foster a culture where local persons in poverty feel heard or understood by 
their local politicians, or does the size of Dallas afford it a larger pool of resources for 
people in poverty to connect to local politics? Is city size key to formulating groups that 
can enact change, or at least, do the people in poverty view Dallas that way? This 
research looks into these questions by asking: How does political efficacy among people 
in poverty differ between a large, distinctly urban metropolitan area (Dallas), and a small, 
rural metropolitan area (Abilene)? Additionally, how does city size affect low-income 
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persons’ feelings of political connectedness and whether or not they feel informed? 
Rationale and Research Questions 
 The literature above raises questions regarding the connection between 
community and political efficacy. The goal of the present research was to study this 
relationship by analyzing differences in political efficacy among low-income populations 
in major, consolidated, or “Level A” metropolitan areas compared to “Level C” more 
rural metropolitan areas and will focus on two cities, Dallas, Texas (a 
major/consolidated/Level A metropolitan area) and Abilene, Texas (a Level C 
metropolitan area), to measure the differences in political efficacy between populations in 
poverty. The United States Census Bureau (2000), in the Geographic Areas Reference 
Manual (GARM), defines a metropolitan area as consisting of “one or more counties that 
contain a city of 50,000 or more inhabitants, or contain a Census Bureau-defined 
urbanized area (UA) and have a total population of at least 100,000” (p. 13-1). An area is 
classified as a consolidated metropolitan statistical area (CMSA) if it has a population of 
1 million or more and is considered a Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA), 
which the U.S. Census Bureau (2000) defines as an MSA consisting “of a large urbanized 
county or a cluster of counties . . . that demonstrate strong internal economic and social 
links in addition to close ties with the central core of the larger area” (p. 13-2). Dallas-
Fort Worth, Texas is designated by the United States Census Bureau as a PMSA and 
CMSA.  
 Metropolitan Areas are further designated by the US Census Bureau into a series 
of four Levels (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000, p.13-7). “Level A” Metropolitan Areas have a 
population of 1 million or more, “Level B” areas contain populations between 250,000 
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and 999,000, “Level C” areas contain populations between 100,000 and 249,000, and 
“Level D” areas contain populations less than 100,000. 
 With its population over 1 million, Dallas itself is classified as a Major 
Metropolitan Area and Central City of the DFW CMSA, which the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2000) designates as a “Level A” MSA, meaning that the area has a population of one 
million or more (p. 13-7). According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2000), a city is 
considered the “central city” of an MSA if it is designated as the largest city in the MSA 
(p. 13-8). Dallas, TX, with its estimated 2013 population of 1,257,676 is the only city in 
the DFW Metroplex with a population over 1 million, making it the central city of the 
DFW CMSA. 
 Abilene, Texas is a city two and a half hours west of the DFW Metroplex. It is the 
central city of the Abilene MSA, and with its estimated 2013 population of 120,099, it is 
designated by the U.S. Census Bureau as a “Level C” MSA (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000; 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2015, p. 13-7). Similarly, it is the only city in the Abilene MSA; all 
other areas in the Abilene MSA have populations under 5,000 residents. Due to the large 
number of surrounding rural communities and lower populations, Abilene’s character, 
though it is a city, is distinctly rural.  
 A comparison of these two cities is beneficial for a couple of reasons. The first is 
it allows us to look at the way that two different sized metropolitan areas differ in the 
way that their low-income populations engage in the political system. Communication 
between local politicians in a large city like Dallas may be significantly different in its 
effectiveness at reaching out to these populations compared to a smaller city like Abilene, 
Texas. Another important thing to take into account is the geographical similarities 
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between these two cities. Separated by less than 200 miles, it would be noteworthy to 
measure the differences between two cities of significantly different sizes that are not in 
different parts of the state/country/world. Undoubtedly, a small city in New England 
would face different problems, challenges, and phenomena than a much larger city in the 
South, due to geographic separation as much as the demographic and size of the 
respective cities. Finding two cities so close to one another is a good way to measure the 
different challenges that two areas face based on their size, more so than the 
responsiveness of state governments, challenges due to climate differences, and other 
factors that may change the way that city governments and their constituents interact with 
one another. Comparing Abilene and Dallas opens up a research possibility that allows 
examination of two areas that are very different from one another, without sacrificing 
their similarities.  
 According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2015), Dallas, Texas experienced 
tremendous population growth between 2013 and 2014. The city of Dallas experienced 
the 8th largest numeric boost in population between 2013 and 2014, adding over 20,000 
new residents in that year (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). This means that a comparison of 
these two MSAs is beneficial because it analyzes different problems facing one of the 
largest and fastest growing cities in American (Dallas) compared to a city like Abilene, 
which is significantly smaller and whose population is growing less exponentially. 
Abilene, surrounded by rural communities, and approximately 1/10th the size of Dallas 
represents a rural metropolitan area, whose population is concentrated but still distinctly 
rural in identification and character. A comparison of Abilene to the urban metropolis of 
Dallas, Texas, is important for understanding the way that people in poverty are affected 
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in their political trust, participation, and feelings of competence based on their location. 
In other words, would community size indeed affect political participation? Thus, further 
analysis asks the differential effects of community size by comparing samples of 
respondents from Abilene with respondents from Dallas on measures of political efficacy 
on matters such as:  Does Abilene’s size compared with Dallas make it easier for people 
in poverty to connect to local political organizations? Does it make it easier to vote in 
local elections? Does Abilene foster a culture where local persons in poverty feel heard or 
understood by their local politicians, or does the size of Dallas afford it a larger pool of 
resources for people in poverty to connect to local politics? Is city size key to formulating 
groups that can enact change, or at least, do the people in poverty view Dallas that way? 
This research looks into these questions by asking: How does political efficacy among 
people in poverty differ between a large, distinctly urban metropolitan area (Dallas), and 
a small, rural metropolitan area (Abilene)? Additionally, how does city size affect low-
income persons’ feelings of political connectedness and whether or not they feel 
informed?  
These types of questions are best assessed in scales designed to measure the 
conceptualizations that lie beneath the questions which typically refer to scales measuring 
political efficacy. Thus, the central research questions for this study ask the following:  
RQ1: Does community size (comparing Abilene vs. Dallas) affect local political efficacy 
(as measured by EPE, IPE, and total efficacy) for low-income persons?  
RQ2: Do perceptions of community size (whether a participant feels that their community 
is large or small) affect local political efficacy (as measured by EPE, IPE, and total 
efficacy) for low-income persons? 
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RQ3: Do perceptions of urbanization (whether a participant feels that their community is 
more rural or urban) affect local political efficacy (as measured by EPE, IPE, and total 
efficacy) for low-income persons? 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY
Participants 
 Participants included low-income residents from two different settings. The first 
group surveyed were urban residents of the Dallas area. These persons are currently 
located in Dallas and receive some level of public assistance from the city of Dallas, or 
some other form of low-income relief from Dallas-area nonprofits. The second 
participant sample was from Abilene, Texas: a much smaller MSA with a more rural 
character, and surrounding areas.  
 The search for a random sample has become more difficult over the last 15 years. 
Fowler (2014), in his reflection on the change in survey techniques, remarks that the 
decline of landlines and growth of the use of cell phones and the Internet has made 
traditional methods of response collection less reliable. He also remarks that Internet 
collection methods have failed to improve reliability or replace the hole being left by 
these changes in technology, and while the merits of Internet sampling are promising, at 
this point they make it difficult to achieve a random sampling of participants. This 
problem proves to be even more difficult when dealing with populations that may not 
have access to a landline, mailing address, or even a home. Door-to-door interviews 
become more difficult with populations that may be transient, difficult to trace and find, 
or otherwise unreachable. 
 The disenfranchising nature of poverty makes random sampling of the population 
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difficult because there is no sample frame or list of persons living in poverty from which 
to draw. The trouble of random sampling in less densely populated areas is documented 
by scholars including Mammen and Sano (2012), who in their research of economically 
disadvantaged rural mothers, found that “random selection of a study population is rarely 
a realistic option for researchers. Thus, studies of rural, low-income mothers most often 
have utilized some form of nonprobability sampling to recruit participants” (p. 464). 
Most notably, research into rural poverty focuses around “recruiting participants through 
community agencies such as welfare offices, Head Start or early Head Start, 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), community clinics, and local health 
departments” (Mammen & Sano, 2012, p. 464). 
 When searching for suitable populations of urban poverty, researchers run into a 
similar problem. Lawless and Fox (2001), in their research of low-income populations in 
urban areas, found that “although [their] goal was to collect data from as varied a sample 
of this population as possible, several factors limited [their] random selection” including 
“most notably, in order to gain access to potential respondents, [they] found it necessary 
to work with community organizations and associations that serve the poor in various 
capacities” (p. 380). Research involving persons who may not have a home address, a 
telephone, or any means of reliable access besides their regular use of the services 
provided by a local organization, government service, or non-profit makes it difficult to 
engage in probability or random sampling, because there is no sample frame to choose 
participants from in the first place. 
 One method of sampling for vulnerable, underground, and difficult-to-reach 
populations is response driven sampling (RDS) which according to Mammen and Sano 
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(2012) is “ a modified form of snowball sampling (which is itself a form of chain-referral 
sampling) [and] was developed to study ‘hidden’ populations that are hard to reach or at 
risk and for whom sampling frames are not available.” This sampling procedure “has 
since been used successfully to study a variety of other urban and rural populations” (p. 
470). The process uses “seeds” of persons that get in contact with one another — similar 
to a snowball sample — but then adjusts the weights of the sample population, meaning 
“bias resulting from using the initial nonrandom sample can be reduced by conducting 
RDS analysis, meant to weight the sample appropriately and verify the network 
connections as well as the reliability of this sampling technique” (p. 470). RDS is a 
modification of the method of chain referral sampling, which, when measuring 
populations that do not have sample frames, can be a more effective means of sampling 
than venue visitation (Harwood, Horvath, Courtenay-Quirk, Fisher, Kachur, McFarlane, 
& O’Leary, 2012). 
 Gaining access to these populations via common venues is an effective way to 
make contact with “hidden” populations, as Lawless and Fox (2001) found in their study 
of urban poor in New York City. According to Harwood and colleagues (2012), to 
compile a proper venue-based sample, it is important to include all possible venue types 
in a sample frame of the venues, when a sample frame of the respondents cannot be 
secured.  This research sought out an N size of around 250 to minimize the probable 
deviation of the findings (Hocking, Stacks, & McDermott, 2003, p. 227). 
Tables 1-7 show the descriptive statistics for the population. The total number of 
respondents was 117. The margin of error for the population size was 7 percent (Hocking,  
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Stacks, & McDermott, 2003, p. 227).  Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for gender, 
made up of 57 males (48.72%) and 60 females (51.28%).  
Table 1 
  
   Descriptives – Sex 
  N 
Valid 
Percent 
Male 57 48.7 
Female 60 51.3 
Total 117 100 
 
Table 2 shows the demographics for age of the population surveyed. Of the 
respondents, the median age of respondents was 47, with over half of the respondents 
being between the ages of 35 and 54.  
Table 2 
   
    Descriptives – Age Groups 
 
  N 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Under 24 6 6 6 
25-34 16 16 22 
35-44 23 23 45 
45-54 33 33 78 
55-64 19 19 97 
65 and up 3 3 100 
Total 100 100 
  
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for race. The racial makeup of the sample 
was 37.17% Black/African American, 1.77% American Indian, 17.7% Hispanic/Latino, 
0.88% Asian, 4.42% Mixed Race, 34.51% Non-Hispanic White, and 1.77% classifying 
themselves as “Other.” 
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Table 3 
  
   Descriptives – Race 
  N 
Valid 
Percent 
African 
American/Black 42 37.2 
American Indian 2 1.8 
Hispanic/Latino 20 17.7 
Asian 1 0.9 
Mixed Race 5 4.4 
Non-Hispanic White 39 34.5 
Prefer Not to Answer 2 1.8 
Other 2 1.8 
Total 113 100 
 
 Table 4 has the descriptive statistics for religion. Regarding religious preference, 
70.48% identified as Protestant, 7.62% identified as Catholic, 1.9% as Jewish, 2.86% as 
Muslim, 3.81% as Buddhist, 5.71% identified as “Other,” and 6.67% identified as having 
no religious preference. The sample’s employment status had over 56.75% respondents 
that claimed to be “unemployed” or “temporarily unemployed.” 
Table 4 
  
   Descriptives – Religion 
  N 
Valid 
Percent 
Protestant 74 70.5 
Catholic 8 7.6 
Jewish  2 1.9 
Muslim 3 2.9 
Buddhist 4 3.8 
Other 6 5.7 
None 7 6.7 
Total 105 100 
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Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for employment status. While some 
participants identified as working full time or working part time, and others (8.1%) 
identified as retired, a large proportion considered themselves unemployed (42.3%). 
Taken along with those that identified as temporarily not working (14.4%), the currently 
unemployed made up over half of the respondents. 
Table 5 
  
   Descriptives – Employment Status 
  N 
Valid 
Percent 
Working Full Time 13 11.7 
Working Part Time 14 12.6 
Temporarily Not 
Working 16 14.4 
Unemployed 47 42.3 
Student 4 3.6 
Retired 9 8.1 
Other 8 7.2 
Total 111 100 
 
Table 6 show the descriptive statistics for self-reported income. Over half of 
respondents reported that they make less than $5000 a year (53.8%), with over three 
quarters of respondents making $15000 a year or less (77.9%).  
Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics for self-identified socioeconomic status. 
Respondents identified as lower class most often (48.6%) with a smaller number 
identifying as working class (13.5%), and even some identifying as middle class (13.5%).
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Table 6 
 
   Descriptives – Income 
 
  N 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Under $5000 56 53.8 53.8 
$5000-$10000 15 14.4 68.3 
$10001-$15000 10 9.6 77.9 
$15001-$20000 6 5.8 83.7 
$20001-$25000 8 7.7 91.3 
$25001-$35000 5 4.8 96.2 
$35001-$45000 2 1.9 98.1 
Over $45000 2 1.9 100 
Total 104 100 100 
 
Table 7 
  
   Descriptives – Self-Identified SES 
  N 
Valid 
Percent 
Lower Class 52 46.8 
Working Class 42 37.8 
Middle Class 15 13.5 
Upper Class 2 1.8 
Total 111 100 
 
Measures 
 Political efficacy was measured using scales employed by Neimi, Craig, and 
Mattei (1990) and Craig, Niemi, and Silver (1990). The larger political efficacy scale is 
made up of two 4-item scales. One scale, tested by Craig, Niemi, and Mattei (1991), 
measures internal political efficacy (IPE), or an “individual’s perception of his or her own 
competence as a political actor . . . apart from his/her evaluations of the political system 
(Pollock, 1983, p. 403).  
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The IPE scale is made up of 4 items. These include how informed a person feels 
about politics and government compared to most people (“I think that I am better 
informed about local politics and government than most people”), how qualified an 
individual feels to participate in local politics (“I consider myself to be well qualified to 
participate in local politics”), the level of understanding the respondent has about 
political issues facing his or her local area (“I feel that I have a pretty good understanding 
of the important political issues facing our community”), and whether or not a person 
feels that they could do as good of a job in public office as others (“I feel that I could do 
as good a job in local public office as most other people”). According to Craig, Niemi, 
and Silver (1990), this scale of internal efficacy “exhibits excellent reliability (alpha = 
0.801)” (p. 292). The present study alpha of internal political efficacy will be revealed in 
section one of the next chapter. 
 The second scale measures external political efficacy (EPE), or “whether or not 
the individual perceives the political system as potentially responsive to popular demand” 
(Pollock, 1983, p. 403). The 4 items included in the EPE scale are measures of whether or 
not respondents feel that there are legal methods to successfully influence government 
(“There are many legal ways for citizens to successfully influence what the local 
government does”), whether or not people have the final say in how their government is 
run (“Under our form of local government, the people have the final say about how the 
community is run, no matter who is in office”), the responsiveness of public officials (“If 
local public officials are not interested in hearing what the people think, there is really no 
way to make them listen.”), and whether or not the participant feels that people like 
him/herself have a say in the way government is run (“People like me don’t have any say 
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about what the local government does”). The reliability of the 4 item external efficacy 
scale is not as high as the internal efficacy scale, but it is still 0.769 (Craig, Neimi, & 
Silver, 1990, p. 302). The present study alpha of external political efficacy will be 
revealed in section one of the next chapter. 
 Both the IPE scale and EPE scale were analyzed separately, but together they 
were compiled into an 8-item scale of political efficacy, meant to combine the two 
measurements of efficacy and create a comprehensive measurement of political efficacy 
that includes the individual’s feelings that political institutions are responsive and that the 
individuals themselves are informed and empowered enough to participate in those 
political institutions. The alpha for total political efficacy will be revealed in section one 
of the next chapter. 
 The second part of this research determined whether or not participants feel as if 
their city size has a negative or positive effect on their participation in local government. 
This question was analyzed by measuring the scale of political efficacy against two 
questions about community size and perceptions of a community, namely whether or not 
the person feels that their community is too small or large (“How do you feel about the 
size of your community?”), and whether or not the respondent feels as if their community 
is more rural or urban (Would you describe your community as more rural [country-like] 
or urban [city-like]?).  
 The EPE, IPE, political efficacy scale, and community size scale were measured 
in relation to the participant’s place of residence and were measured for their relationship 
with various demographics including age, race, and gender to determine the determinants 
of EPE, IPE, and TPE. Results measured the effects of city size and location on the 
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political efficacy and agency of persons in poverty, how much of an effect exists, as well 
as what were the strongest predictors of political efficacy. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS
Reliability of Scales 
 The scales of internal, external, and total political efficacy can be seen in Table 8. 
For the four-item internal political efficacy scale, the reliability was moderately high 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .672), though not passed the generally accepted level (alpha = .700). 
However, when analyzing the scale with an item deleted, the internal political efficacy 
scale does not seem to improve its reliability when any of the four items are deleted, 
indicating that the scale is relatively reliable and cannot be improved by removing any 
items. When looking at the reliability of the external political efficacy scale, the scale 
itself shows remarkably high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .844). Removing any items 
from the scale only appears to decrease the reliability of the external political efficacy 
scale. When the two four item scales are put together into an 8-item scale of total political 
efficacy, the reliability of the total scale is well beyond the .70 threshold (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .745).  
Table 8 
     
      Political Efficacy Scale Reliability 
   
      Scale N of Items Cronbach's Alpha 
Total Political Efficacy (TPE) 8 0.84 
External Political Efficacy (EPE) 4 0.67 
Internal Political Efficacy (IPE) 4 0.75 
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Political Efficacy Based on City 
 First, the scales were analyzed to determine a difference of means between 
persons living in Abilene and those living in Dallas. Table 9 shows that comparison. 
There was no significant difference of means for external political efficacy, with the 
mean for the city of Dallas (x̄ = 13.33) being only slightly higher than the mean for the 
city of Abilene (x̄=12.61), and not significant (p = .35). The difference in IPE was a 
similar trend, with people in Dallas (x̄ = 13.37) having a slightly higher mean than those 
of Abilene (x̄ = 12.43), a mean difference that was also not statistically significant (p 
= .12). The final comparison of the two groups, under the TPE scale, also showed no 
significant difference, with Dallas participants having a slightly higher (x̄ = 26.70) mean 
than participants from Abilene (x̄ = 25.02). This difference of means was also not 
statistically significant (p = .12).    
Table 9 
     
      Independent Samples t-Test of City 
        City Mean t df Significance 
EPE Dallas 13.33 0.94 109 0.35 
 
Abilene 12.61 
   IPE Dallas 13.37 1.57 108 0.12 
 
Abilene 12.43 
   TPE Dallas 26.7 1.59 108 0.12 
  Abilene 25.02       
 
 Table 10 shows the comparison of the scales when efficacy was recoded Low/Hi 
(under the median is designated Low IPE/EPE/TPE while over the median is designated 
as High IPE/EPE/TPE). Chi-Square analysis was then used to determine if there was a 
significant difference between participants in Dallas and participants in Abilene. For 
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Low/Hi EPE, there was no significant difference (p = .327), with residents of Dallas and 
Abilene both having greater instances of higher than average EPE. For IPE, there was no 
significant difference either, and while participants of Abilene had greater numbers of 
Low IPE while Dallas participants had larger percentages of High IPE, this difference 
was not significant (p = .09). When chi-square analysis was used to determine a 
difference between Low/Hi TPE, there was also no significant difference between Dallas 
participants and Abilene participants, with both cities having greater instances of Hi TPE 
than Low TPE (p = .44).   
Table 10 
     
      City Comparison of Efficacy (Low/Hi) 
 
      
  City 
Chi-
Square df Significance 
 
Dallas Abilene 
   EPE 
  
1.39 1 0.33 
Low 28.1% 38.3% 
   Hi 38.3% 61.7% 
   IPE 
  
3.21 1 0.09 
Low 36.8% 53.3% 
   Hi 63.2% 46.7% 
   TPE 
  
0.90 1 0.44 
Low 31.6% 40.0% 
   Hi 68.4% 60.0%       
 
Between the comparison of means for independent samples and the discriminant 
analysis comparing the Low/Hi political efficacy in relation to city, the data shows no 
significant relationship between city and political efficacy, indicating that there is not a 
significant difference between living in Abilene and living in Dallas in regards to one’s 
political efficacy. 
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Political Efficacy and Perceptions of Community Size 
 Next, the perceptions of community size were measured against the political 
efficacy scales to determine whether or not there was a relationship about feelings of 
community size and political efficacy. Table 11 shows those results. There was no 
notable relationship between perceptions of community size and political efficacy. The 
analysis of variance within and among groups for EPE was not significant (p=.53), and 
this was the case for IPE (p=.24) and TPE (p=.98). What this shows is that a participant’s 
feelings about whether or not their community was too big or too small had no significant 
effect on a participant’s political efficacy.  
Table 11 
        
         One-Way ANOVA of Perceptions of City Size and Political Efficacy 
 
         
      
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Significance 
 
Between 
Groups 52.8 4 13.2 0.8 0.53 
EPE Within Groups 1721.97 104 16.56 
  
 
Total 1774.77 108 
   
 
Between 
Groups 56.12 4 14.03 1.41 0.24 
IPE Within Groups 1038.56 104 9.99 
  
 
Total 1094.68 108 
   
 
Between 
Groups 13.94 4 3.49 0.11 0.98 
TPE Within Groups 3410.41 104 32.79 
    Total 3424.35 108       
  
Table 12 shows the analysis of differences between groups when political efficacy 
scales are recoded as Low/Hi. There does not appear to be a significant or measurable 
relationship between a participant’s feelings about their community size and their levels 
of political efficacy. When measuring the comparison of perceptions of community size 
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and EPE, the difference was not significant (p=.35), and the relationship between 
community size and IPE was even less significant (p=.64). When analyzing the 
relationship between perceptions of community side and total political efficacy (TPE), 
the results were not significant, with a p value of 0.75.  
Table 12 
            
              Perceptions of Community Size and Efficacy (Low/Hi) 
  
              
Perceptions of Community Size 
Chi-
Square df Sig. 
 
Way too 
small 
A little 
too small 
Perfect 
Size 
A little 
too big 
Way too 
big 
   EPE 
     
4.47 4 0.35 
Low 2.6% 17.9% 48.7% 23.1% 17.7% 
   Hi 6.8% 13.7% 50.7% 12.3% 16.4% 
   IPE 
     
2.55 4 0.64 
Low 7.5% 17.0% 50.9% 11.3% 13.2% 
   Hi 3.4% 13.6% 49.2% 20.3% 13.6% 
   TPE 
     
1.91 4 0.75 
Low 7.1% 19.0% 47.6% 16.7% 9.5% 
   Hi 4.3% 12.9% 51.4% 15.7% 15.7%       
 
Political Efficacy and Perceptions of Urbanism 
Table 13 shows the analysis of perceptions of rural/urbanism and political 
efficacy. The difference between groups in EPE was not significant (p=0.9), indicating 
that there was not a significant difference between those that felt that their city was more 
urban/rural and their level of external political efficacy. The analysis of rural/urban 
perceptions and IPE were also not significant (p=.91), indicating that the perceptions of 
Dallas and Abilene as more rural or urban had no measurable relationship with a 
respondent’s feelings of internal political efficacy. Lastly, when analyzing the 
relationship between urban/rural perceptions and total political efficacy (TPE), there did 
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not seem to be a significant variance between or within groups (p=.86), indicating that a 
participant’s perceptions of whether or not their community was more urban or rural had 
no measurable relationship with their TPE.  
Table 13 
       
         One-Way ANOVA of Rural/Urban and Political Efficacy 
         
      
Sum of
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
 
Between Groups 17.84 4 4.46 0.27 0.9 
EPE Within Groups 1655.2 99 16.72 
  
 
Total 1673.04 103 
   
 
Between Groups 10.87 4 2.72 0.25 0.91 
IPE Within Groups 1066.67 99 10.78 
  
 
Total 1077.54 103 
   
 
Between Groups 43.18 4 10.79 0.33 0.86 
TPE Within Groups 3280.33 99 33.14 
    Total 3323.5 103       
 
The relationship between rural/urban perceptions and political efficacy were then 
calculated using a recoded scale of IPE, EPE, and TPE as Low/Hi. Table 14 shows the 
results of that analysis. For EPE, there was not a significant difference between those that 
felt that their community was more rural/urban when it came to measures of political 
efficacy. The difference was not significant (p=.94). This was the same for IPE, which 
had a similar significance level (p=.93), and TPE, which had a significance level of 
p=0.8.  
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Table 14 
           
             Perceptions of Rural/Urbanism and Efficacy (Low/Hi) 
      
             
 
Perceptions of Community Size     Sig. 
 
 
Rural 
Mostly 
Rural 
Equally 
Urban and 
Rural 
Mostly 
Urban Urban 
Chi-
Square df 
 
 
EPE 
     
0.76 4 0.94 
 
Low 8.10% 10.8% 35.1% 27.0% 18.9% 
   
 
Hi 4.30% 10.1% 37.7% 26.1% 21.7% 
   
 
IPE 
     
0.84 4 0.93 
 
Low 5.90% 11.8% 39.2% 25.5% 17.6% 
   
 
Hi 5.50% 9.1% 34.5% 27.3% 23.6% 
   
 
TPE 
     
1.63 4 0.80 
 
Low 7.50% 12.5% 32.5% 30.0% 17.5% 
   
 
Hi 4.50% 9.1% 39.4% 24.2% 22.7%       
 
 
Between the Analysis of Variance and the chi-square analysis on the relationship 
between perceptions of urban/rural community, there appears to be no significant 
relationship between a participant’s feelings of political efficacy and their perceptions of 
the urban/rural nature of their respective communities. 
Determinants of Political Efficacy 
 What factors have a significant effect on local political efficacy for low-income 
persons? If city and perceptions of urbanization/ruralization and community size have no 
significant effect on local political efficacy, what demographics and factors do have a 
significant relationship with local political efficacy? When analyzing the different 
demographic factors and their relationship with political efficacy, there were a couple of 
items that had a significant effect on the internal, external, and total political efficacy of 
low-income persons. These factors were race and religion. 
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Race 
 Table 15 shows an analysis of variance for race and political efficacy. Because 
some race categories had too small of an N-size for Post-Hoc analysis, race was recoded 
into a 4 item nominal variable made up of African American/Black, Hispanic/Latino, 
Non-Hispanic White, and Other. There was a significant difference between groups when 
measuring political efficacy. This relationship was significant for EPE (p=0.01), IPE 
(p=0.05), and TPE (p=0.01). 
Table 15 
        
         One-Way ANOVA of Race and Political Efficacy 
  
         
      
Sum of
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig 
 
Between 
Groups 170.39 3 56.80 3.79 0.01 
EPE 
Within 
Groups 1605.47 107 15.00 
  
 
Total 1775.86 110 
   
 
Between 
Groups 75.14 3 25.05 2.60 0.05 
IPE 
Within 
Groups 1019.55 106 9.62 
  
 
Total 1094.59 109 
   
 
Between 
Groups 360.74 3 120.25 4.16 0.01 
TPE 
Within 
Groups 3063.63 106 28.90 
    Total 3424.37 109       
 
Table 16 shows post-hoc analysis for the difference of political efficacy based on 
the recoded race variable. LSD analysis between groups breaks down the difference 
between race groups. For EPE, the difference in means between African American and 
Non-Hispanic Whites was significant (p=0.03), with African Americans having a higher 
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mean for external political efficacy than Non-Hispanic Whites. For Hispanic/Latinos, 
there was a significant difference of means for both Non-Hispanic Whites (p=0.00) and 
“Other” (p=0.05), indicating that Hispanic/Latino respondents have significantly higher 
levels of political efficacy than both Non-Hispanic Whites and “Other.” 
 When analyzing the difference between groups for IPE, the trends are similar. 
African Americans have significantly higher instances of internal political efficacy than 
both Non-Hispanic White (p=0.03) and “Other” (p=0.02); however, Hispanics/Latinos 
did not differ significantly from other groups in average IPE. Non-Hispanic Whites had 
significantly lower instances of IPE than African Americans (p=0.03), but there was not 
a significant difference in IPE between Non-Hispanic whites and Hispanic/Latinos or 
“Other.”  
 The difference between groups for race and TPE indicated a couple of significant 
relationships. The first was the significant difference between African Americans and 
Non-Hispanic Whites (p=0.00), as well as the difference between African Americans and 
“Other” (p=0.03). African Americans tended to have higher levels of total political 
efficacy than both of these groups, but did not differ significantly from Hispanic/Latinos. 
Hispanic/Latinos had significantly higher instances of TPE than Non-Hispanic Whites 
(p=0.02) and “Other” (p=0.05). Non-Hispanic Whites had lower levels of TPE than both 
African Americans and Hispanic/Latinos, but did not differ significantly from “Other.” 
 Overall, we can see that there is a significant relationship between race and 
political efficacy, with African Americans and Hispanic/Latinos having significantly 
higher instances of local political efficacy than Non-Hispanic Whites and “Other.” 
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Table 16 
    
      Post-Hoc LSD Analysis of Race and Political Efficacy 
   
      
Scale Race Mean 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
EPE 
 
Hispanic/Latino 14.95 -1.35 0.22 
African American/Black Non-Hispanic White 11.62 1.98 0.03 
(x̄ = 13.60) Other 12.15 1.45 0.25 
 
African American/Black 13.60 1.34 0.22 
Hispanic/Latino  Non-Hispanic White 11.62 3.33 0.00 
(x̄ = 14.95) Other 12.15 2.79 0.05 
 
African American/Black 13.60 -1.98 0.03 
Non-Hispanic White  Hispanic/Latino 14.95 -3.33 0.00 
(x̄ = 11.62) Other 12.15 -0.54 0.67 
 
African American/Black 13.60 -1.45 0.25 
Other Hispanic/Latino 14.95 -2.79 0.05 
(x̄ = 12.15) Non-Hispanic White 11.62 0.54 0.67 
IPE 
  Hispanic/Latino 12.58 1.35 0.12 
African American/Black Non-Hispanic White 12.38 1.54 0.03 
(x̄ = 13.93) Other 12.15 -2.34 0.02 
 
African American/Black 13.93 -1.35 0.12 
Hispanic/Latino Non-Hispanic White 12.38 0.20 0.82 
(x̄ = 12.58) Other 11.58 1.00 0.39 
 
African American/Black 12.38 -1.54 0.03 
Non-Hispanic White Hispanic/Latino 12.58 -0.20 0.82 
(x̄ = 12.38) Other 11.58 0.80 0.44 
 
African American/Black 13.93 -2.34 0.02 
Other Hispanic/Latino 12.58 -1.00 0.39 
(x̄ = 11.58) Non-Hispanic White 12.38 -0.80 0.44 
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Table 16 (continued) 
 
 Race Mean 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
TPE 
 
Hispanic/Latino 27.53 0 1.00 
African American/Black Non-Hispanic White 24.00 3.53 0.00 
(x̄ = 27.53) Other 23.58 3.94 0.03 
 
African American/Black 27.53 0 1.00 
Hispanic/Latino Non-Hispanic White 24.00 3.53 0.02 
(x̄ = 27.53) Other 23.58 -3.94 0.05 
 
African American/Black 27.53 -3.53 0.00 
Non-Hispanic White Hispanic/Latino 27.53 -3.53 0.02 
(x̄ = 24.00) Other 23.58 0.42 0.82 
 
African American/Black 27.53 -3.94 0.03 
Other Hispanic/Latino 27.53 -3.94 0.05 
(x̄ = 23.58) Non-Hispanic White 24.00 -0.42 0.82 
 
Religion 
 The second variable demonstrating a significant relationship with political 
efficacy was religion. Due to low instances of response in many of the response 
categories, post-hoc analysis could not be conducted, but Table 17 shows the religion 
variable recoded into a dummy variable for Protestantism. There is a significant 
difference of means between Protestants and non-Protestants (p = 0.05) for TPE, though 
there is not a significant difference between Protestants and non-Protestants for either 
EPE or IPE. It does appear that Protestants experience higher instances of total political 
efficacy than other religions, though this relationship loses significance when TPE is 
broken down into EPE and IPE. 
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Age 
Another variable with a significant relationship with political efficacy is age 
(shown in Table 18), which had a significant difference between groups for EPE (p = 
0.02), though it did not seem to significantly affect either IPE or TPE.  
Table 18 
       
         One-Way ANOVA of Age Groups and Political Efficacy 
  
         
      
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
 
Between Groups 237.24 5 47.45 3.01 0.02 
EPE Within Groups 1436.31 91 15.78 
  
 
Total 1673.55 96 
   
 
Between Groups 12.25 5 2.45 0.25 0.94 
IPE Within Groups 880.86 91 9.68 
  
 
Total 893.11 96 
   
 
Between Groups 245.41 5 49.08 1.61 0.17 
TPE Within Groups 2783.23 91 30.59 
    Total 3028.64 96       
 
Table 19 shows the post-hoc results when conducted on age groups in relation to 
EPE. There is a significant difference of means between 55-64 year olds and almost 
every other group, including 25-34 year olds (p = 0.01), 35-44 year olds (p = 0.00), and 
Table 17 
    
      Independent Samples t-test Protestant 
          Mean t df Sig 
EPE Not Protestant 12 -1.81 109 0.07 
 
Protestant 13.45 
   IPE Not Protestant 12.44 -1.03 108 0.31 
 
Protestant 13.11 
   TPE Not Protestant 24.39 -1.92 108 0.05 
  Protestant 26.56       
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45-54 year olds (p = 0.01). In all of these groups, 55-64 year olds had significantly higher 
levels of external political efficacy than other groups besides those that were in the 
highest and lowest age categories.  
Table 19 
     
       Post-Hoc LSD Analysis of Age and Political Efficacy 
       
Scale Age Mean 
Mean 
Difference Std. Error Sig. 
EPE 
 
25-34 11.81 1.19 1.90 0.53 
 
35-44 11.14 1.86 1.83 0.31 
Under 24 45-54 12.63 0.38 1.77 0.83 
(x̄ = 13.00) 55-64 15.78 -2.78 1.87 0.14 
 
65 and up 12.67 0.33 2.81 0.91 
 
Under 24 13.00 -1.19 1.90 0.53 
 
35-44 11.14 0.68 1.31 0.61 
25-34 45-54 12.63 -0.81 1.22 0.51 
(x̄ = 11.81) 55-64 15.78 -3.97 1.37 0.01 
 
65 and up 12.67 -0.85 2.50 0.73 
 
Under 24 13.00 -1.86 1.83 0.31 
 
25-34 11.81 -0.68 1.31 0.61 
35-44 45-54 12.63 -1.49 1.10 0.18 
(x̄ = 11.14) 55-64 15.78 -4.64 1.26 0.00 
 
65 and up 12.67 -1.53 2.45 0.53 
 
Under 24 13.00 -0.38 1.77 0.83 
 
25-34 11.81 0.81 1.22 0.51 
45-54 35-44 11.14 1.49 1.10 0.18 
(x̄ = 12.63) 55-64 15.78 -3.15 1.17 0.01 
 
65 and up 12.67 -0.04 2.40 0.99 
 
Under 24 13.00 2.78 1.87 0.14 
 
25-34 11.81 3.97 1.37 0.01 
55-64 35-44 11.14 4.64 1.26 0.00 
(x̄ = 15.78) 45-54 12.63 3.15 1.17 0.01 
 
65 and up 12.67 3.11 2.48 0.21 
 
Under 24 13.00 -0.33 2.81 0.91 
 
25-34 11.81 0.85 2.50 0.73 
65 and up 35-44 11.14 1.53 2.45 0.53 
(x̄=12.67) 45-54 12.63 0.04 2.40 0.99 
 
55-64 15.78 -3.11 2.48 0.21 
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Table 19 (continued)      
Scale Age Mean  
Mean 
Difference Std. Error Sig. 
IPE 
 
25-34 12.06 0.10 1.49 0.94 
 
35-44 12.95 -0.79 1.43 0.58 
Under 24 45-54 12.78 -0.61 1.38 0.66 
(x̄ = 12.17) 55-64 12.67 -0.50 1.47 0.73 
 
65 and up 11.67 0.50 2.20 0.82 
 
Under 24 12.17 -0.10 1.49 0.94 
 
35-44 12.95 -0.89 1.02 0.39 
25-34 45-54 12.78 -0.72 0.95 0.45 
(x̄ = 12.06) 55-64 12.67 -0.60 1.07 0.57 
 
65 and up 11.67 0.40 1.96 0.84 
 
Under 24 12.17 0.79 1.43 0.58 
 
25-34 12.06 0.89 1.02 0.39 
35-44 45-54 12.78 0.17 0.86 0.84 
(x̄ = 12.95) 55-64 12.67 0.29 0.99 0.77 
 
65 and up 11.67 1.29 1.91 0.50 
 
Under 24 12.17 0.61 1.38 0.66 
 
25-34 12.06 0.72 0.95 0.45 
45-54 35-44 12.95 -0.17 0.86 0.84 
(x̄ = 12.78) 55-64 12.67 0.11 0.92 0.90 
 
65 and up 11.67 1.11 1.88 0.55 
 
Under 24 12.17 0.50 1.47 0.73 
 
25-34 12.06 0.60 1.07 0.57 
55-64 35-44 12.95 -0.29 0.99 0.77 
(x̄ = 12.67) 45-54 12.78 -0.11 0.92 0.90 
 
65 and up 11.67 1.00 1.94 0.61 
 
Under 24 12.17 -0.50 2.20 0.82 
 
25-34 12.06 -0.40 1.96 0.84 
65 and up 35-44 12.95 -1.29 1.91 0.50 
(x̄ = 11.67) 45-54 12.78 -1.11 1.88 0.55 
 
55-64 12.67 -1.00 1.94 0.61 
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Table 19 (continued)     
Scale Age  Mean 
Mean 
Difference Std. Error Sig. 
TPE 
 
25-34 23.88 1.29 2.65 0.63 
 
35-44 24.09 1.08 2.55 0.67 
Under 24 45-54 25.41 -0.24 2.46 0.92 
(x̄ = 25.17) 55-64 28.44 -3.28 2.61 0.21 
 
65 and up 24.33 0.83 3.91 0.83 
 
Under 24 25.17 -1.29 2.65 0.63 
 
35-44 24.09 -0.22 1.82 0.91 
25-34 45-54 25.41 -1.53 1.69 0.37 
(x̄ = 23.88) 55-64 28.44 -4.57 1.90 0.02 
 
65 and up 24.33 -0.46 3.48 0.90 
 
Under 24 25.17 -1.08 2.55 0.67 
 
25-34 23.88 0.22 1.82 0.91 
35-44 45-54 25.41 -1.32 1.53 0.39 
(x̄ = 24.09) 55-64 28.44 -4.35 1.76 0.02 
 
65 and up 24.33 -0.24 3.40 0.94 
 
Under 24 25.17 0.24 2.46 0.92 
 
25-34 23.88 1.53 1.69 0.37 
45-54 35-44 24.09 1.32 1.53 0.39 
(x̄ = 25.41) 55-64 28.44 -3.04 1.63 0.07 
 
65 and up 24.33 1.07 3.34 0.75 
 
Under 24 25.17 3.28 2.61 0.21 
 
25-34 23.88 4.57 1.90 0.02 
55-64 35-44 24.09 4.35 1.76 0.02 
(x̄ = 28.44) 45-54 25.41 3.04 1.63 0.07 
 
65 and up 24.33 4.11 3.45 0.24 
 
Under 24 25.17 -0.83 3.91 0.83 
 
25-34 23.88 0.46 3.48 0.90 
65 and up 35-44 24.09 0.24 3.40 0.94 
(x̄ = 24.33) 45-54 25.41 -1.07 3.34 0.75 
  55-64 28.44 -4.11 3.45 0.24 
 
Regression Modeling for Determinants of Political Efficacy 
 After analyzing the different demographic factors and their relationship with 
political efficacy, variables were input into linear regression with EPE, IPE, and TPE to 
determine the determinants of IPE, EPE, and TPE. The variables of City, perceptions of 
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rural/urbanism, and perceptions of city size were included as well. 
 Interval demographic data was input and measured alongside EPE, IPE, and TPE 
to determine the effect of certain factors such as religious attendance, age, income, and 
SES on different levels of political efficacy, and while there was not a significantly 
reliable model for either IPE or TPE, the external political efficacy model showed 
significance in explaining some influences on political efficacy from these variables 
(p=0.05).  
Backward step linear regression was conducted to evaluate the prediction of 
various interval/ordinal demographic factors on political efficacy. The results are shown 
in Table 20. This model had an R-Square value of 0.15, indicating that the regression 
model accounted for 15% of political efficacy. The variables that showed the greatest 
weight in determining political efficacy were income (β= -0.20) – with persons making 
more amounts of money displaying lower instances of EPE (p=0.03) – and age (β= 0.22), 
with older respondents having lower levels of EPE (p=0.04).  
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Table 20 
     
      Backwards Step Linear Regression Standardized Coefficients for EPE 
Independent 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Community Size -0.04 
    Urban/Rural 0.96 0.22 
   Religious 
Attendance -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 
  SES 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 
 Income -0.25* -0.24* -0.23* -0.24* -0.20 
Age 0.22 0.22 0.23* 0.18 0.22* 
      
Constant 10.13*** 9.69*** 10.90*** 9.78*** 10.75*** 
Standard Error 2.71 2.41 1.99 1.82 1.72 
R Square 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.90 
F 2.18** 2.62** 3.08** 3.47** 3.97** 
* p < .05      ** p < .01     *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)   
 
Regression shows that income and age are the best predictors of political efficacy, 
specifically external political efficacy. Model 5 is the clearest example of this. When 
removing all other variables, income (β= -0.20) and age (β= -0.23) have the highest and 
most statistically significant weights for predicting EPE. The model also indicates that 
urbanization/ruralization and perceptions of community size are not potent predictors of 
political efficacy, due to their low beta and elimination from later regression models.
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION
The results indicate a couple of different patterns. The first apparent conclusions 
are the lack of significant difference between Abilene and Dallas residents in their 
political efficacy. What this means is that there does not seem to be a relationship 
between city and political efficacy. The difference between Level A MSA’s and Level 
C’s does not seem to be there. Though the difference in these two cities may be a 
difference in the number of resources or direct immediacy of local political institutions 
and politicians, there seems to be a threshold of resources necessary that indicate higher 
levels of political efficacy, and it appears that both Abilene and Dallas, Texas meet that 
threshold, indicating that there is not a significant difference between the two groups and 
their levels of political efficacy. 
 Similar to the lack of relationship demographically between Abilene and Dallas, 
there also does not appear to be a significant relationship between the level of 
urbanization/ruralization and political efficacy. Perceptions of urbanization do not seem 
to have an effect on the levels of political efficacy for low-income persons. What this 
means is that there does not seem to be a measurable difference between people that feel 
that their community is more “country-like” or “city-like,” and their feelings of internal, 
external, and total political efficacy. Groups that felt that they lived in an urban area did 
not vary significantly from those that felt that their community was more rural.  
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 This lack of relationship between urbanity and rurality was also reflected in the 
perceptions of community size. There did not appear to be a significant relationship 
between how big a respondent felt that their community was and their levels of political 
efficacy. This meant that if a resident of Dallas felt that their community was too big or 
too small, it did not have a measurable effect on their political efficacy. However, there 
seem to be a couple of demographic factors that do have a measurable relationship with 
political efficacy.  
 The first factor with a significant relationship with political efficacy is race. 
African Americans and Hispanic/Latinos both had measurably larger instances of 
internal, external, and total political efficacy than Non-Hispanic Whites and “Other.” 
This is interesting, especially within the parameters of low-income respondents, because 
it indicates that these communities feel more politically connected compared to their 
Non-Hispanic White counterparts. 
 This relationship could be a result of social service organizations and social 
institutions offered to African Americans and Hispanics that Non-Hispanic Whites don’t 
have as much access to, such as politically active Black Protestant churches and race 
advocacy groups. Low-income Non-Hispanic Whites may have less access to these social 
institutions, and lacking the networks provided to middle or high income Non-Hispanic 
Whites, may lack access to the institutions that would make them feel more efficacious. 
This explanation could apply to the “Other” category as well. In the south, Asian 
Americans, American Indians, and other groups do not have the same population sizes as 
larger ethnic groups, and may lack access to cohesive community programs and 
institutions that the larger ethnic groups can create.  
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 External political efficacy is the more robust driver, showing stronger 
relationships with the various demographic indicators than IPE, though this relationship 
accumulated in TPE as well. EPE was also a more reliable measure than IPE, and tended 
to have stronger differences between groups. Religion proved to be a pretty strong 
predictor of political efficacy, though mostly for Protestants, which displayed higher 
instances of political efficacy than non-Protestants, specifically for external political 
efficacy and total political efficacy. What this indicates is that Protestants feel more 
capable of affecting their political system than non-Protestants, and this higher level of 
external efficacy makes them feel more influential and involved in the political process 
overall than other religious groups. This trend also points to EPE as the main driver of 
TPE demographically, because religious affiliation did not have a significant relationship 
with a person’s feeling of personal qualification to engage in the political process, it only 
had a relationship with their perceived ability to access the structures of local politics and 
change them from their current position.  
 Age also had a significant relationship with efficacy, though this relationship, like 
that of Protestantism, was driven primarily by EPE, and did not have any significance 
with IPE or even a total measure of political efficacy. What this means is that 45-54 year 
olds were the most disillusioned with the political system compared to other groups, 
believing that the structures of politics were not influenced by their actions or the 
electoral process. Other groups had higher levels of external political efficacy, including 
young (Under 24) and older (65 and up) participants, indicating that they feel that they 
have more access to the political system, and that the political system is capable of  
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change, while decision-making remains in the hands of the electorate, even if that 
electorate is low-income. 
Diffusion of Innovation 
 The displayed results tell us a number of things about political efficacy and the 
role of the city in politics. First, the role of communities in diffusion of innovations 
shows the importance of political structures and communities towards fostering this 
innovation. Political efficacy for low-income African Americans and Hispanics was 
significantly higher than low-income Non-Hispanic Whites. This may be a result of 
strong institutions that encourage the diffusion of ideas among their population. The 
central role that institutions play in the lives of low-income populations of color may 
have something to do with the larger instances of political efficacy. African American 
community leaders may use social service organizations like non-profits and Black 
churches to encourage constituents to exercise their political rights. Hispanic/Latinos may 
have more access to social justice organizations such as immigrant rights/Hispanic rights 
organizations. These ethnicity specific organizations are not necessarily available to low-
income Non-Hispanic White persons, who also lack access to the social organizations 
available to middle- and high-income Non-Hispanic White persons. Therefore, Non-
Hispanic Whites may lack access to networks that encourage local political engagement. 
 This application of diffusion may apply to religious groups as well. For 
Protestants (especially evangelicals), engagement in local political systems may be 
encouraged by church leaders and even other church members. The heterogeneous 
makeup of evangelical Protestant denominations may exhibit a level of heterophily that 
encourages diffusion and activism within local political institutions and electoral politics. 
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This differs from non-Protestant religious groups which may have less present and active 
religious organizations to plug into, especially for individuals that don’t attend some sort 
of religious organization regularly. This influence from community leaders within the 
church and influence of heterophilous members would be something that those without a 
religious affiliation would have to find elsewhere, something that may be difficult for 
low-income persons. In that way, the political engagement of Evangelical Protestants 
matched with the encouraged diffusion within religious institutions may be the reason 
that Protestants are more externally politically efficacious, with a belief that the structures 
of power can change and produce new and better policies. 
Rethinking Classical Theories of Urbanization 
 The inability to find a significant difference in political efficacy calls us to rethink 
the way that we view the social phenomenon of urbanization and its effect on the political 
activity and access of its constituents. It appears that the growth of the city has a different 
effect on the political efficacy of its constituents than urban theory would suggest. 
Anomie 
 The concept of anomie does not seem to manifest itself based on the growth of 
social institutions like the city. The larger city does not seem to increase anomie or 
disconnection, at least within the local political realm. It appears that the structural 
differences between cities is not the only thing that does not indicate a measurable 
difference in anomie, but even perceptions of city size or different levels of urbanization 
don’t seem to increase disconnection from the local political sphere.  
 The political efficacy of a low-income person does not show a relationship to 
what city they live in, or how big that they feel that city is. Similarly, how urban or rural 
58 
 
    
a participant feels that their community is does not seem to correlate with their feelings of 
political efficacy. The argument that increased mechanization and institutionalization has 
a negative effect on an individual’s personal feelings of social connection does not seem 
to manifest itself in political engagement.  
Gemeinschaft and Gessellschaft 
 The results of city and political reaffirm the argument made by Christenson 
(1984) that the concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are a continuum, rather than a 
binary. The effects of community and institutional size is not a black and white 
comparison between two different entities, but rather, the groups both experience aspects 
of Gesellschaft present in the conceptualization of interactions between individuals and 
ecological institutions such as those found in the city. This could be the reason that it was 
difficult to measure a difference between the two cities, because, in fact, dividing the two 
groups in a binary system is an inherently simplistic view of Tönnies’ concept of 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. It does not take into account the complicated relationship 
that factors into the differences and similarities of two distinct communities.  
 Another interpretation of the results and their relation to the theory of 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is that they affirm Bell’s (1992) assertion that the 
differentiation between more rural and more urban areas is not important enough to 
study, claiming that many of the differences between the two do not hold relevance 
today. It seems rash to insist that there is no role for analyzing the impact that 
urbanization has on social phenomena like political efficacy, especially since these results 
only compare two designated MSAs and their variation in perceptions of urbanism, rather 
than comparing a strictly urban area to a strictly rural area. A better interpretation is to 
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treat the concept of urbanization as a complex interaction between population 
demographics, change, and cultural shifts. Making the argument that something is strictly 
urban or rural rejects the nuanced view that urbanization is a process with a number of 
interrelated parts that interact along a continuous line between ruralization and 
urbanization.  
Mechanical and Organic Solidarity 
 Similar to the theories of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, the results and their 
application of mechanical and organic solidarity call us to analyze the role of the city and 
urbanization in a more nuanced way than we have in the past. Analyzing two cities and 
finding that they don’t differ much on their levels of political efficacy, even when 
measuring the perceptions of community size, seems to indicate that there is a threshold 
in social interaction that we breach where our interactions with others and our 
interactions with social institutions like the political system breach mechanical solidarity 
and move into organic solidarity. It is not clear from these results at what point that 
threshold is breached, but it would appear that Abilene and Dallas don’t seem to differ 
significantly in the social relations between low-income persons and their local political 
institutions. When this is combined with the perceptions of size results, it appears that 
both groups experience organic solidarity, regardless of their perceptions of their 
community size. 
 On the other hand, this shift to organic solidarity may not be apparent to low-
income persons. When we take into account the urban/rural distinction and political 
efficacy, there does not seem to be a significant relationship. Low-income persons’ levels 
of political efficacy don’t seem to shift based on how urban or rural they feel that their 
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community is, indicating that they are not aware of the shift in institutional relationships 
that occur when a community transitions from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity. 
A New Approach to Evaluating Urban Connection 
Taking into account the application of the current research to theories of diffusion 
and innovation, it is important to evaluate these theories in a way that synthesizes their 
meaning and ensures their relevance today in an increasingly urbanized world. With this 
increase in the prominence and presence of the city, we will see an increase in the 
prominence and presence of structures and institutions (specifically those that thrive and 
grow in urban contexts), and it is important to recognize the role that those structures as 
well as their various components play in relieving or intensifying inequality and 
marginalization. If Diffusion is a key component of adopting ideas that improve a group’s 
social, political, or economic position, it is important for that diffusion to encourage the 
adoption of those innovations that do lessen inequality, and diffusion through 
organizations and social structures is an important aspect of relieving inequality. 
 The importance of Diffusion through social structures requires us to analyze and 
interrogate the role that those structures play in society to encourage or discourage that 
Diffusion. When the world continues to concentrate itself into cities, it is vital that those 
cities and the structures within them encourage that diffusion; however, as analysis of 
classical urbanization theories shows through this research, the role of the city is not a 
dichotomy, and the size and differences of cities cannot be reduced to the concepts of 
Gemeinschaft and Gessellschaft or Mechanical and Organic Solidarity as binaries. 
Instead, to analyze the role that these structures play in diffusing innovation among their 
populations, it is important to recognize these theories as existing on a continuum that 
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flow in their assistance (or lack thereof). 
 The city and its effect on a person's feelings of efficacy is not binary, but 
continuous. Similarly, its effect cannot be attributed to a singular characteristic of the 
structure of the city. Instead, the city and its various institutions influence its constituents 
in a variety of ways. The interaction of demographics and different phenomena such as 
race, religion, income, and self-described socioeconomic status all work with one another 
to increase or mitigate the influence of the city on the political efficacy of populations. 
This is especially the case for marginalized populations, which rely on various levels of 
social interactions and networks to access efficacy. These may include churches and 
other groups that encourage cohesion and contribute to the efficacy of an individual. The 
idea of "strength in numbers" is something that results not simply from the presence or 
absence of a dense and concentrated population, but from the way that concentration 
interacts with various levels of social organization other than simply "living in the city."  
 This seems to fit with Spence, McClerking, and Brown's (2009) analysis of the 
importance of black mayors in cities with larger populations of African American/Black 
constituents in developing and improving political efficacy in those communities. Things 
like racial solidarity, especially through social organizations like Black Protestant 
churches work in tandem with the demographic concentrations of the city to increase the 
social ties of a constituent. Social ties increase political efficacy, especially among 
traditionally marginalized groups, like African Americans and low-income persons. 
However, having social ties through group identification (like religious affiliation and 
race) becomes an interrelated factor with the ability to locate and participate in those 
various groups, something that the population concentration of the city improves.  
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 A marginalized population dispersed over large areas is only further mitigated by 
that lack of access to various social networks. Lack of access to transportation (private or 
public) and time makes the city a vital and fostering environment for community and 
self-advocacy. While this solidarity may become more organic, as people can no longer 
form the voluntary organization in these large groups that they had in smaller groups, the 
tradeoff is a larger resource pool to gain that community from, more community leaders, 
and a sense of belonging to a large and powerful group. The city, though it may produce 
cultures of Gesselschaft, uses its sheer size and concentration to interact with groups and 
improve access issues that may not be available outside of the city. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 A number of limitations in this research can be remedied by future projects and 
studies of this phenomenon. This research had limits with the sample frame, the 
sampling, as well as the scope of the research question and the reliability of the IPE scale. 
 The first limitation is that of the sample population. This research only analyzed 
low-income persons, not the general population. This parameterized population was 
intentional to study the effect of city, perceptions of city size, and perceptions of 
urbanization on the political efficacy of low-income persons. Still, these results cannot be 
generalized to the population of either of these cities. Similarly, the limit to just two 
MSAs in the same state is a limitation of the research. More comprehensive and 
latitudinal research over a number of different urban communities may be a good way to 
determine the generalizability of the findings.  
 Another limitation of the research is the construction of the IPE scale. The scale 
had lower reliability than that of EPE or the TPE scale. This could be a result of a number 
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of different problems, but one could be that the wording of questions does not take into 
account the educational or reading level of some low-income participants, that may have 
been confused or overwhelmed by the wording of the questions. Future research should 
focus on developing a scale that more reliably measures marginalized populations, such 
as those in poverty. 
 A third limitation was the lack of a survey distributed in Spanish. This was due to 
language proficiency and budgetary restrictions, and though it did not become a 
significant problem in surveying local participants, it may provide an explanation for the 
lower levels of Hispanic/Latino response. 
 The biggest gap that this research presents is the measurement of the rural urban 
divide and political efficacy. Though this research did look at two different categories of 
city and analyzed different perceptions of urbanization/ruralization in those areas, it did 
not collect any data from actual rural areas. Future research should look into ways to 
access rural poor populations and how their political efficacy differs from that of the 
urban poor.  
Conclusions 
 The role of the city and urbanization in the diffusion of political power to 
marginalized persons is still an important subject of study. The way that low-income and 
minority constituents interact with their politicians is largely dependent on their own 
perceptions that the electoral system produces change, and that the change it produces is 
beneficial to those constituents. Politicians can improve this communication structure by 
seeing the way that the environment in which these groups live alters or affects that 
structure. 
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 The question of the role in the city and the local political decision-making process 
is far from answered. As our world grows increasingly more urbanized and dependent on 
the institutions inherent in city life, studying those institutions and the benefit or cost that 
they provide to the citizens of that city is important to make those institutions better. At 
the same time, while some areas grow increasingly urbanized, it is also important to study 
the institutions of those that are excluded from this urbanization process (whether that 
exclusion is voluntary or not). In the end, the role of our environment in shaping our own 
positions in society is a worthy and engaging subject of study. 
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APPENDIX B 
INFORMED CONSENT
To Whom It May Concern, 
 The purpose of this study is to determine how low-income persons feel about 
politics and their own role in the political process in Dallas and Abilene, TX. Participants 
will being asked a series of questions on the feelings they have about their own power 
within the local political system.  
 Participants must be aged 18 or older. Participants under the age of 18 will not be 
interviewed. By signing below, you agree to participate in survey, and you agree to your 
responses being recorded and used for research purposes. Although there is no reasonable 
risk to your person for participating in the study, some questions may produce a level of 
mental discomfort. This is unlikely, but possible, and you may refuse to answer any 
questions and stop completing the survey at any time.  
 No attempt will be made to identify you by name through your responses to the 
questions and you will never be asked for information that would allow anybody to 
identify you personally, though you may be asked for your age, race, and gender. The 
original survey responses will be accessible only by the principal researcher. Your survey 
will be collected and stored, but the survey responses will be physically locked and 
protected by computer password. These responses will be accessible only by the principal 
researcher. Your individual responses will be kept confidential and will not be shared 
with others.   
 You should not expect to receive any payment or other reward for your 
participation in the research. You may stop the survey at any time, withdraw your 
consent, or refuse to answer any questions without intimidation. You may also contact 
the researcher at any time after the survey with any questions that you may have about 
the survey, process, or research. 
  Questions about the research, your rights as a participant, or anything else can be 
forwarded to Dylan Brugman via phone at (325) 674-2292 or via email 
dab10a@acu.edu. You may also contact the ACU Office of Research and Sponsored 
Programs via email at orsp@acu.edu, or via phone at (325) 674-2285.  
 By signing, you agree that you are 18 years or older, understand and accept the 
risks involved in your participation, and agree to participate and have your responses 
recorded and used 
 
Printed Name: ______________________________________ 
Signature:__________________________________________ 
Date:__________________________ 
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PARTICIPANT SURVEY
The following are a list of questions and responses regarding your feelings about 
political participation and your local government. The term “local government” 
includes all elected officials of your local community (city, town, or county). Some 
examples of local government officials include your city council, mayor, and school 
board. You should not include your thoughts about not elected (appointed) 
authorities (police, government workers, etc.), nor should you include national 
government officials (your Senator, Congressional Representative, the President, 
etc.). There are no right or wrong answers, and your responses will be kept 
confidential (meaning that nobody will be able to identify you based on your 
responses). 
 
1. Do you consent to participate in this survey and agree to have your answers 
included in the study? 
 
a. Yes   b. No 
 
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements: 
 
2. “There are many legal ways for citizens to successfully influence what the local 
government does.” (LEGAL) 
 
a. Strongly Agree  b. Agree c. Neutral/Don’t Know d. Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
3. “Under our form of local government, the people have the final say about how the 
community is run, no matter who is in office” (FINALSAY) 
 
a. Strongly Agree  b. Agree c. Neutral/Don’t Know d. Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
4. “If local public officials are not interested in hearing what the people think, there 
is really no way to make them listen.” (MAKELSTN) ** 
 
a. Strongly Agree  b. Agree c. Neutral/Don’t Know d. Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
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5. “People like me don’t have any say about what the local government does.” 
(NOSAY) ** 
 
a. Strongly Agree  b. Agree c. Neutral/Don’t Know d. Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
6.”I think that I am better informed about local politics and government than most 
people” (INFORMED) 
 
a. Strongly Agree  b. Agree c. Neutral/Don’t Know d. Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
7. “I feel that I could do as good a job in local public office as most other people” 
(PUBOFF) 
 
a. Strongly Agree  b. Agree c. Neutral/Don’t Know d. Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
8. “I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in local politics” 
(SELFQUAL) 
 
a. Strongly Agree  b. Agree c. Neutral/Don’t Know d. Disagree  
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
9. “I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues 
facing our community” (UNDERSTAND) 
 
a. Strongly Agree  b. Agree c. Neutral/Don’t Know d. Disagree  
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
10. Would you describe your community as more rural (country-like) or urban 
(city-like)? 
 
a. Urban  b. Mostly urban c. Equally urban and rural d. Mostly rural 
e. Rural 
 
11. How do you feel about the size of your community? 
 
a. Way too big b. A little too big c. Perfect size        d. A little too small      
e. Way too small 
 
**Please flip paper over to complete the survey** 
 
12. What is your sex? 
 
a. Male  b. Female c. Other/Prefer not to answer 
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13. What year were you born? 
 
_________________________________ 
 
14. What socioeconomic class would you consider yourself? 
 
a. Upper Class b. Middle Class c. Working Class  d. Lower Class 
 
15. What is your employment status? 
 
a. Working full-time 
b. Working part-time 
c. Temporarily not working 
d. Unemployed 
e. Retired 
f. Student 
h. Other 
 
16. What is your race? 
 
a. Black or African American 
b. American Indian 
c. Hispanic/Latino 
d. Asian 
e.  Mixed race/More than one racial heritage 
f. Non-Hispanic White 
g. Prefer not to answer 
h. Other ______________ 
 
17. What is your religious preference? 
 
a. Protestant 
b. Catholic 
c. Jewish 
d. Muslim 
e. Buddhist 
f. Hindu 
e. Other ___________________ 
f. None 
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18. How often do you attend religious services? 
a. Never 
b. Less than once a year 
c. Once or twice a year 
d. Several times a year 
e. Once a month 
f. 2-3 times a month 
g. About weekly 
h. Weekly 
i. Several times a week 
 
19. How many people (including yourself) are in your household? 
 
__________ 
 
20. What is your yearly household income before taxes? 
 
a. Under $5,000 
b. $5,000-$10,000 
c. $10,001-$15,000 
d. $15,001-$20,000 
e. $20,001-$25,000 
f. $25,001-$35,000 
g. $35,001-$45,000 
h. Over $45,000 
